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SUMMARY
Nepal is home to numerous natural disaster risks, including earthquakes, floods, 
avalanches, landslides, droughts, famines, epidemics and cold waves. Understanding and 
assessing disaster management practice in Nepal is especially important in light of the April 
2015 Gorkha earthquake. This project considers the degree to which disaster management policy 
in Nepal coincides with international best practice in disaster management, both in theory and in 
practice. This paper presents an overview of vulnerability in Nepal, international best practices 
related to disaster management, and existing policies and practices in Nepal. Results indicate 
that social vulnerability is higher in western Nepal and that many of Nepal’s disaster 
management policies align closely with best practice in theory but not in practice.
INTRODUCTION
Purpose and Significance
Disasters are devastating worldwide but have especially severe consequences in 
developing countries. With accelerating population growth and climate change, more people in 
developing countries inhabit high-risk areas (Islam & Lim, 2015, p. 60). People in developing 
countries are more likely to die from disasters and less likely to have the resources to recover. 
From 1980 to 2012, 42 million life years were lost worldwide, with more than 80% of lost life 
years coming from low and middle income countries (UNISDR, 2015a, p. v). Asia, home to 
60% of the world’s population, had 85% of the world’s disaster-related casualties in 2011 (Islam 
& Lim, 2015, p. 57). Understanding what makes disasters in Asia so devastating is essential in 
reducing disaster casualties and increasing resilience to natural disasters.
While empirical research about disaster management is abundant in developed countries, 
there is a noticeable dearth of academic research on developing countries, especially in terms of 
management planning. In Haiti, Indonesia, and, more recently, Nepal, large-scale natural 
disasters drew public attention to the ineptitudes of disaster management policies. One central 
question in disaster management literature concerns the transferability of management lessons 
across space and time. Can lessons from 9/11 and 3.11 inform contemporary policy and 
planning in the U.S. and Japan? Are the same lessons relevant in contemporary Mexico and 
China? Differences across social, political, and economic structures often determine if a disaster 
catalyzes positive change or undoes decades of development work, and many of the structures 
that keep natural events from becoming natural disasters in developed countries are lacking in 
the developing world.
This project asks: To what extent do the Government of Nepal’s (GoN) disaster 
management policies align with international best practice in disaster management in theory and 
in practice? Though there are many tenets of best practice in disaster management, this project 
focuses on principles related to hazard mitigation and decentralization of disaster management 
policy and planning. Effective disaster management in Nepal is paramount in light of the April 
2015 Gorkha earthquake, which claimed nearly 9,000 lives and caused more than 10 billion USD 
of physical damage. The devastation of the Gorkha earthquake indicates that GoN disaster 
management policies failed to identify and address fundamental vulnerabilities. In the years 
preceding the 2015 earthquake, GoN reports expressed intentions to make disaster management 
policies more proactive and locally driven. It is clear that competent local institutions are 
important to effective management. Even in highly centralized management situations, central 
governments eventually rely on local governments and institutions to communicate and share 
funds with disaster victims.
Though natural disasters are eerily common and frequently devastating in Nepal, there is 
limited academic research on social vulnerability and natural hazard risk in Nepal. Vulnerability 
expert Susan Cutter (2003) notes that little academic research compares social vulnerability 
across places (p. 243). Cutter et al. (2003) created a social vulnerability index for counties in the 
United States based on variables ranging from simple (percentage female population, percentage 
non-white population, etc.) to complex (value of commercial developments, density of medical 
services.) (p. 246). The study determined higher social vulnerability in counties in the southern 
half of the United States, due mostly to racial inequality and fast population growth (p. 255).
This project creates a simplified social vulnerability index similar to Cutter et al.’s to 
demonstrate the dispersion of social vulnerability and the complexity of natural hazard risks in
ethnically and topographically diverse Nepal. Understanding social and environmental 
vulnerabilities is essential in developing effective disaster management policies. By mapping 
vulnerability and risk in Nepal, this project validates the need for locally driven management and 
planning and increased attention to highly vulnerable districts in far-western Nepal.
This project, unfortunately, suffers from limited data availability in Nepal. Many of the 
variables used in Cutter et al.’s study and other social vulnerability studies (see Flanagan et al., 
2011) are not available for Nepal. Most of the data missing for this project relate to 
infrastructure. This project, therefore, primarily uses demographic variables to assess social 
vulnerability. Furthermore, what little data are available tend to be at a high level of 
aggregation. While Cutter et al. were able to use county-level data for the United States, this 
project uses district-level data for Nepal. Aggregating variables such as socioeconomic and 
minority status can skew results, as can the exclusion of potentially significant variables. 
Improving data collection and management should be a GoN policy in future disaster 
management planning.
This project also considers the GoN’s Ministry of Home Affairs’ biannual Nepal Disaster 
Reports from 2009, 2011 and 2013 as evidence of GoN planning and management priorities. 
Pre-2009 reports and the 2015 report are currently unavailable. Empirical research in Nepal 
would be necessary to better understand GoN disaster management priorities before the Gorkha 
earthquake. The 2009, 2011, and 2013 reports are indicative of growing pressure from 
international donors to develop grassroots capacity for disaster management. Though the GoN 
received criticism for its mismanagement of the 2015 Gorkha earthquake, many tenets of 
international best practice are visible in GoN disaster management policy.
A common theme in the GoN’s biannual Disaster Reports from the 2000s is the need to 
prepare for the long-anticipated megaquake. The 2009 Disaster Report ominously eluded to the 
Gorkha earthquakes:
Noting that no major earthquake has occurred ... [in] the central Himalayan gap, over the 
past several centuries, seismologists , predict that any part of this segment could 
experience a major earthquake with a magnitude over 8 in the near future, (p. 109).
In addition to wreaking havoc on central Nepal, the Gorkha earthquake drew attention to the
likelihood of a much larger earthquake in the near future. Seismologists hypothesize that the
2015 earthquake released only a fraction of the seismic pressure building along the fault line
since the last major earthquake in 1344. Estimates place an impending 8.4M megaquake with an
epicenter west of the 2015 earthquake (Hand & Pulla, 2015, p. 485). More than eighteen months
after the Gorkha earthquakes, the GoN is yet to mobilize an effective nationwide recovery.
Considering the high probability of a much larger earthquake, it is more imperative than ever that
the GoN revisit its existing policies to reduce vulnerability.
The Gorkha Earthquake
The Gorkha earthquake on April 25, 2015, with a moment magnitude scale of 7.8Mw, is 
the most destructive natural disaster in Nepal’s modem Gorkha Statistics1
8,891 Deaths
189,000 People displaced
605,000 Houses destroyed
288,000 Houses damaged
was in the eponymous Gorkha district. Though 80 km 
from Nepal’s capital city, Kathmandu, the Gorkha
earthquake caused severe damage to the densely populated capital city and the second largest 
city, Pokhara (Hand & Pulla, 2015, p. 485). The GoN’s inefficiency in responding to the Gorkha 
earthquake can be explained partially by chaos in Kathmandu. Even 3 days after the earthquake, 
the Kathmandu airport struggled to accommodate the surge in traffic; within 4 days, rescue 
teams were yet to reach many districts surrounding the Kathmandu Valley (Sharma, 2015, p. 
1819).
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The above maps show Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA) and casualties in the Gorkha 
earthquake normalized by 100,000. PGA measures maximum ground acceleration during an 
earthquake, while the Mercalli or Richter scales measure the total energy released. Importantly, 
the above maps demonstrate that districts with higher PGA values did not necessarily have 
higher rates of casualties. Social vulnerability is a plausible explanation for the incongruity 
between PGA and casualty rates. Districts with higher normalized rates of casualties but lower 
PGA may have less seismically resistant structures or more vulnerable populations.
It is unclear if the casualties occurred as a result of the physical or social elements of the 
Gorkha earthquakes. Physical elements entail actual ground movement, subsequent landslides, 
and structural collapses; while social elements include access to emergency services, shelter 
camps, and financial resources. Researchers debate whether disasters can and should be 
separated from their effects (Dombrowsky, 1998, p. 20). To assess policy and management, it is
important to separate damage in terms of direct and secondary effects; policy interventions can 
do little to prevent unpredictable, extreme events like earthquakes from occurring but can be 
instrumental in determining the extent of secondary effects. As such, a deeper examination of 
the breakdown of casualties related to disasters in Nepal could shed more light on the efficacy of 
Nepal’s disaster management policies.
In many cases, effective management before and after a disaster saves lives and reduces 
damage. In January and February 2010, Haiti and Chile, respectively, experienced large-scale 
earthquakes.2 Though Chilean earthquake released 500 times more energy than the Haitian 
earthquake, effective policies and strong management significantly reduced the devastation of 
the Chilean earthquake (Useem et al., 2015, p. 93). Chile’s strong building codes prevented 
thousands of casualties and insulated the government and private citizens from financial losses. 
Widespread private insurance coverage meant that the private sector absorbed much of the 
financial shock from the earthquake, allowing Chile’s government to spend more on public 
reconstruction. The Chilean recovery from the Maule earthquake depended largely on what 
Useem et al. (2015) call “a mutually reinforcing combination of able national leadership and 
strong institutional practices” (p. 109). The leadership and institutions that made Chile’s 
recovery possible may not exist in Nepal today but can be aspirational for future policy changes. 
Definition of Terms
This project uses many terms commonly seen in disaster management literature, 
including “vulnerability,” “risk” and “disaster.” There is no singular definition of what qualifies 
as a disaster, and definitions vary across disciplines. Researchers squabble as to whether the
2 The January 2010 Haitian earthquake had a Richter Scale magnitude of 7.0Mw; the February 2010 Chilean 
earthquake, known as the Maule earthquake, measured 8.8Mw.
term “disaster” refers to a natural event, the effects of a natural event, the social implications of 
an event, or all of the above. Regardless of the definition used, it is essential to consider the 
social component of disasters. As Lowell Carr (1932) explained, “ ... so long as the city resists 
the earth-shocks, so long as the levees hold, there is no disaster. It is the collapse of the cultural 
protections that constitutes the disaster proper” (p. 211). Most sociological definitions of 
disaster are similar, defining disasters as the extreme, sudden onset events that disrupt everyday 
life.
Enrico L. Quarantelli (2008), a leader and early founder in the field of disaster sociology, 
identifies six characteristics of disasters: 1) everyday community social functions and social 
institutions are suddenly interrupted, 2) many organizations cease operating or operate in a 
reduced manner, 3) local officials are unable to complete their usual work tasks, 4) most aid 
comes from distant areas, 5) nonlocal mass media outlets cover the crisis, and 6) high-ranking 
government officials and organizations become involved (p. 874). The Gorkha earthquake in 
Nepal certainly meets all of the above characteristics. Most other events in Nepal, such as 
smaller earthquakes, floods, and landslides, do not garner the attention of international 
organizations and the central government and would therefore not fit Quarantelli’s (2008) 
definition of disaster.
Less catastrophic natural events, such as the 1988 Udaypur earthquake and the 2008 
Koshi floods, significantly disrupted everyday community functions and encouraged nationwide 
policy changes. These events are therefore still defined as “disasters” for this study. The below 
infographic from the UN OCHA 2017 Nepal Country Profile highlights earthquakes and floods 
as the largest natural disaster risks in Nepal (UN OCHA, 2017). Based on the definitions used in
this project, the “human” disasters, a reference to the People’s War from 1996-2006, are not 
considered disasters.
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Quarantelli (2001) also breaks the term “disaster” into five categories: natural, 
technological, famine, epidemic, and conflict (p. 335). Some research includes all five 
categories as a definition of disaster. Researchers debate how to define famines, epidemics, and 
droughts (FEDs) within the field. Quarantelli (2001) argues to consider FEDs as “chronic stress 
settings rather than crisis operations” (p. 334). This project ascribes to Quarantelli’s definition of 
disasters and focuses primarily on earthquakes, floods and landslides, though FEDs, avalanches, 
and cold waves are also common in Nepal. It is challenging to compare sudden onset disasters, 
like earthquakes and floods, with slow-forming disasters like FEDs. Governments are more 
likely to have advance information about slow-forming disasters, which can alter public 
response. Sudden onset disasters, on the other hand, require immediate, adaptive decision­
making and often involve major reconstruction. In Nepal, floods and earthquakes have served as 
the main stimuli for policy innovation. Therefore, for this study, “disasters” are considered only 
to be sudden onset extreme weather events that require nonlocal responses.
Risk, vulnerability, hazard, and resilience are also complex terms in disaster management 
literature. Cutter et al. (2003) simply define vulnerability as “potential for loss” (p. 242). Cutter 
and Finch (2008) later expanded on this definition, explaining that vulnerability is “driven by
exposure, sensitivity and response and ... requires measurements of both environmental and 
social systems...” (p. 2301). This project uses Flanagan et al.’s (2011) definition of vulnerability 
as “the extent to which persons or things are likely to be affected” (p. 1). Various indices use 
different variables to define vulnerability. In general, vulnerability refers to social factors that 
influence a given community’s potential for loss. Cutter et al.’s (2003) hazards-of-place model 
include indicators of gender, socioeconomic status, race/ethnicity, age, commercial development, 
employment, rural/urban, residential property, infrastructure, homeowner occupation, 
professional occupation, family structure, education, rate of population growth, medical services, 
dependence on social services, and special needs/disabled populations (p. 246). The data for 
many of these indicators are unavailable at the district-level in Nepal. This project, therefore, 
uses indicators similar to those in Flanagan et al.’s (2011) study, which breaks vulnerability into 
four categories: socioeconomic status, household composition/disability, minority 
status/language, and housing/transportation (p. 4). While vulnerability represents the social 
factors of disaster risk, “hazard” can be explained as the biophysical component of disaster risk. 
Disaster risk is typically considered a function of hazard and vulnerability. A simplified 
explanation of the relationship between risk, vulnerability, and hazard is: Risk = Hazard + 
Vulnerability (Islam & Lin, 2016, p. 62).
Methodology & Organization
This project is divided into two chapters. The first chapter is primarily descriptive and 
spatially presents biophysical and social vulnerability factors for Nepal. The second chapter 
examines concepts in international best practice for disaster management and existing policies in 
Nepal. These chapters are designed to provide a preliminary case study of vulnerability and 
policy in Nepal. The final section of this project explains conclusions and next steps for
research. This paper uses the term “GoN” to refer to any agencies officially related to the 
Government of Nepal. Due to lack of transparency related to government activities and the 
absence of empirical research for Nepal, it is often unclear which agencies and/or individuals are 
directly behind a given policy decision. A deeper empirical study would delve deeper into the 
nuances of GoN organizations and individual personalities involved in decision-making.
All maps and tables were created by the author using ArcMap 10. All maps are 
graduated color maps, using a Natural Breaks (Jenks) classification and display district-level 
boundaries for Nepal. Data sources for maps are available in the bibliography section. All maps 
are projected in GCS_WGS_1984; all scales measure distance in kilometers.
Social vulnerability is an important, often missing, component of effective disaster 
management policies. The Gorkha earthquake disproportionately affected vulnerable 
populations in Nepal. The UNDP (2016) estimates that 26% of damaged houses had female 
heads, 41% were dalits or indigenous communities, and 23% were senior citizens (p. 1). Though 
extensive research exists on social vulnerability affecting different castes, minorities and ethnic 
groups in India, such robust research is lacking for Nepal. The 2009 and 2011 Disaster Reports 
focus on natural hazard risks more than social vulnerability. Understanding the complex social 
and environmental factors that affect Nepal’s vulnerability to natural hazards is essential in 
considering Nepal’s disaster management priorities, policies, and opportunities.
The social vulnerability index presented in this chapter demonstrates the spatial 
variability of vulnerability throughout Nepal. Social vulnerability is inherently challenging to 
quantify and is often sacrificed to provide deeper analysis of biophysical vulnerability. Cutter et 
al. (2003) suggest that vulnerability indices should consider social vulnerability (age, race, 
health, income, etc.) as well as place vulnerability (urbanization, growth rates, etc.) (p. 243).
The index presented in this chapter only includes social vulnerability, as much data related to 
place vulnerability were unavailable. A future project would benefit from incorporating the 
factors considered in Cutter et al.’s (2003) hazards-of-place model of vulnerability.
Furthermore, an extension of this project would likely use VDC-level data. This project uses 
district-level data as VDC-level data was available for only a small number of variables.
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“Biophysical vulnerability” refers to the natural factors influencing a place’s 
vulnerability. Nepal’s varied topography exposes the population to a range of natural hazards 
and complicates the implementation of effective nationwide disaster management plans. A 
country slightly larger than the state of Arkansas, Nepal has three distinct ecological zones 
ranging from the subtropical southern Terai region to the cold mountainous Himalayan region in 
the north (see above map). Nepal’s complex climate results in a range of natural hazards. The 
2011 Disaster Report identifies floods, landslides, fires, epidemics, and droughts as “regular 
disasters,” occurring throughout the country with some frequency; small earthquakes occur 
often, though occasional large earthquakes can be devastating {Nepal Disaster Report, 2011, p. 
8). Avalanches and cold waves are also common in parts of Nepal. The below map demonstrates 
that the most densely populated districts in Nepal are those in the low lying, semi-tropical Terai 
region along the southern border with India.
The following section demonstrates the spatial distribution of hazard risks in Nepal. 
Earthquakes, floods, fires, and landslides are well documented and therefore discussed in depth 
in this section. Though some risks, such as avalanches and floods, are more common in specific 
ecological zones, it is clear that each district faces more than one type of hazard risks. Based on 
the definition of disasters as sudden onset events, FEDs are not considered in this section, though 
maps of epidemics and droughts are provided in Appendix B. Maps of cold waves and 
avalanches are also included in Appendix B. These maps only consider the frequency of extreme 
events because available data do not provide strong evidence as to the severity of individual 
events. A future study with more robust data would account for variety in the severity of 
different extreme hazard events. During the time frame presented (1991-2010), the only major
disaster event was the Koshi flood of 2008.
Earthquakes
Inherently unpredictable, earthquakes present a unique challenge to policy makers and 
planners in Nepal. The Seismic Hazard Mapping and Risk Assessment for Nepal identified 92 
active faults throughout the country {Nepal Disaster Report, 2011, p. 5). Failure to plan for and 
mitigate earthquakes can have devastating social and economic consequences. The 1988 
Udaypur earthquake, with a moment magnitude of 6.5Mw, killed 721 people, injured 6,553 
people, and made 460,000 people homeless. The earthquake caused 78.5 million US dollars of 
damage to housing, 62.4 million dollars of damage to roads and bridges, and 32 million US 
dollars of damage to schools {Nepal Disaster Report, 2011, p. 73). The 2011 Disaster Report 
notes that the Udaypur earthquake brought to light the overall inadequacy of Nepal’s current 
building practices, “this earthquake showed that the current building construction practice was 
not strong enough to resist even moderate earthquakes” (p. 79). Tragically, the Gorkha 
earthquake provided supplemental evidence to shortcomings in Nepal’s building codes.
The earthquakes shown in the above map were mostly minor quakes, though eastern 
Nepal experienced a major earthquake in 2011. The Nepal-Sikkim earthquake on September 18, 
2011 had a moment magnitude of 6.9Mw. The earthquake affected 7,746 families in 12 districts 
in eastern Nepal and damaged more than 6,000 buildings (Hada, 2014, p. 354). Even after the 
devastation of the Udaypur earthquake, the GoN was unable to implement strong building codes 
and management policies to prevent the 2011 earthquake from becoming a disaster.
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This map demonstrates that no district in Nepal had fewer than 4 floods between 1991 
and 2010, and that floods predominantly occur in the semi-tropical Terai region in southern 
Nepal. It is important to note that the characteristics and severity of floods vary throughout the 
country. Though more common in the Terai, floods in the Himalayan region can be particularly 
devastating. Glaciers in the high Himalayan region are melting at an increasing rate, causing an 
increase in glacial lake outburst floods (GLOF) (Moench & Dixit, 2004, p. 42). In 1985, the Dig
Tsho moraine dam collapsed, releasing freezing glacier melt and causing over 3 million US 
dollars of damage (ICIMOD, 2011, p. 4). The International Centre for Integrated Mountain 
Development (ICIMOD) conducted a major study of glacial lakes in the Nepal Himalayas in 
2009. To reduce GLOF risks, ICIMOD (2011) recommended implementing early warning 
systems, investing in mitigation, and engaging communities in risk reduction (p. 84).
The two most severe floods between 1991-2010 were the 1993 flood in the Mahabharat 
Range and the 2008 Koshi flood. The 1993 flood affected over 8,000 families in Makawanpur 
and 3,000 families in Dhading (NepalDisaster Report, 2011, p. 81). The 2011 Disaster Report 
claims there was “no preparedness at any level” and that poor communication with officials led 
to unfounded rumors (Nepal Disaster Report, 2011, p. 85). Still, the 2011 Report argues that the 
management of the 1993 flood was the best in Nepal’s history, due largely to lessons learned 
from the 1988 Udaypur earthquake (Nepal Disaster Report, 2011, p. 86).
While the floods in Makawanpur and Dhading may be examples of successful 
management, the Koshi flood of 2008 is a clear example of mismanagement. The Koshi Flood of 
2008 caused 56 casualties, 55 of which were from illnesses contracted in displacement camps 
(Nepal Disaster Report, 2011, p. 92). That only one casualty occurred during the actual flooding 
in Koshi is an obvious indication of mismanagement. The GoN failed to provide clean, safe 
camps with adequate resources, leading to all but one of the casualties in the Koshi flood. In 
addition to casualties, the Koshi flood damaged almost 300km of road, 6 bridges, and 67 culverts 
(Nepal Disaster Report, 2011, p. 93). The east-west highway, one of Nepal’s most important 
transport routes, was impassable 3 months, causing major disruptions to national and 
international trade. The Flood also caused major damage to phone lines for 2 days (Nepal
Disaster Report, 2011, p. 97). These infrastructural failures indicate a troubling lack of 
preparedness.
Landslides & Fires
Landslides, fires, cold waves and avalanches, however common and devastating, are less 
likely to meet Quarantelli’s (2008) criteria for defining disasters. Unlike the Gorkha earthquake, 
these “regular disasters” do not receive as much attention from international media outlets, aid 
organizations, or the central government. Furthermore, landslides, avalanches, fires and cold 
waves are less likely to motivate major policy change, as their effects are generally more 
spatially limited than earthquakes and floods. The below maps indicate that landslides and 
avalanches are generally more frequent in the northern Himalayan region, while fires and cold 
waves are more frequent in the Terai in the south. Both landslides and fires occur at relatively 
high frequencies; between 1970 and 2015, landslides constituted 23% of all disasters in Nepal 
(UNOCHA, 2017).
Like social vulnerability, natural hazard risks vary throughout Nepal. Frequent, small- 
scale natural disasters such as fires, droughts, cold waves, and avalanches cause severe damage 
to livelihoods and infrastructure, not to mention human casualties. Occasional, large-scale 
disasters, like the 1988 Udaypur earthquake and the 2008 Koshi flood, are often transformative 
for citizens and government officials. These major disaster events sparked the development and 
implementation of new policies to improve disaster management, most notably the National 
Calamity Relief Act (NCRA) and Local Self-Governance Act (LSGA). A much longer study 
would include important biophysical vulnerability factors, such as slope, access to water, etc., to 
assess natural hazard risk more thoroughly. A complete hazard vulnerability index, coupled with 
the social vulnerability index presented in the next section, would paint a much clearer picture of 
risk and vulnerability in Nepal.
SOCIAL VULNERABILITY
This section presents a map of the final Social Vulnerability Index, in addition to 
socioeconomic and minority status. Maps for other variables can be found in Appendix C. 
Variables for this index were included based on availability. An expansion of this study would 
provide a more nuanced look at some of the variables presented here, especially socioeconomic 
and minority status. Both variables are complex and important in understanding social 
vulnerability. Due to limited data availability, this project presents simplified variables for both 
socioeconomic and minority status.
This index uses eight variables to assess social vulnerability in Nepal representing: 
socioeconomic status, minority status, gender ratio, homeownership rates, absenteeism, average 
household size, disabled populations, and dependency ratio. Each variable was downloaded in 
Excel and joined to a district-level shapefile of Nepal’s 75 districts. Resultant shapefiles were 
rasterized (ArcToolbox > Conversion Tools > Feature to Raster). A model was created in 
ModelBuilder using Site Analysis Tools in ArcToolbox. Rasterized files for the eight variables 
were reclassified so that a high value of each variable corresponded to higher vulnerability. The 
minority status variable was reclassified to be categorical, such that 0=not minority, l=minority. 
A weighted overlay was created in ModelBuilder; all variables were weighted equally (Spatial 
Analyst Tools > Weighted Overlay > Equal Influence). Finally, a conditional function was used 
to identify districts with the greatest vulnerability (Spatial Analyst Tools > Conditional > Con, 
SQL: socvul=6 OR socvul=7).
Social Vulnerability Index Variables
Variable Description Calculation Effect on 
Vulnerability
Source
hdi Socioeconomic status Human 
Development Index HDI (life 
expectancy, education, per 
capita income)
N/A High HDI = Low 
Vulnerability
HDI
min Minority Status 
whether or not majority 
population in district is 
national ethnic majority
0=Majority ethnic 
group is Brahmin 
or Chhetri 
l=Major ethnic 
group is national 
minority
High Minority 
Population = High 
Vulnerability
Nepal. National 
Planning Commission 
Secretariat. 
Population 
Monograph of Nepal: 
Volume II (Social 
Demography).
Central Bureau of 
Statistics, 2014. Web. 
30 November 2016.
sex Female Population
% of the population that is
female
(female pop)/(total 
pop)
High Female Pop = 
High Vulnerability
DistricWise 
Population 2011 VI
home Homeowner ship 
% of homes that are owner- 
occupied (as opposed to 
rented, institutional or other)
(owned)/(total) High
Homeownership = 
Low Vulnerability
Nepal Household and 
Population Data at 
District Level,
Hhld Table 1
absent Absentee Population
% of population absent from
household
(absent
population)/total
pop
High absenteeism = 
High Vulnerability
Nepal Household and 
Population Data at 
District Level, 
HhldTablel 1
hh Household Size 
average household size
N/A High average HH 
size = High 
vulnerability
Nepal Household and 
Population Data at 
District Level,
Indv Table 12
disab Disabled Population 
% of the population with 
disabilities (physical, 
blindness, deafness, deaf- 
blind, speech problem, mental 
disability, intellectual 
disability, multiple 
disabilities)
(total pop-pop 
without
disabilities)/total
pop
High disabled 
population = High 
Vulnerability
Nepal Household and 
Population Data at 
District Level, 
IndTab24
age Dependency Ratio
Ratio of dependent population
to working age population
(population over 
age
60)/(population 
under age 15 
normalized by 
100)
High Dependency 
Ratio = High 
Vulnerability
Nepal, National 
Planning Commission 
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This map of the HDI by district indicates that western Nepal tends to be less developed 
than central and eastern Nepal. The HDI measures life expectancy, education, and per capita 
income and is therefore a useful composite variable to represent socioeconomic status. Many of 
the lowest scoring districts are also Nepal’s most remote. Some of the districts with the lowest 
HDI are also some of the most densely populated. Rautahat, Sarlahi, Mahottari, and Siraha are 
located in the densely populated terai region bordering India. The tropical climate and low 
terrain make these regions highly susceptible to tropical diseases like malaria and flooding 
during the monsoon season.
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Minority status and language are important indicators of social vulnerability in Nepal. A 
caste-based society, Nepal has many marginalized groups who have been excluded from political 
process for decades. Minorities face unique risks in emergency situations because they tend to 
have less access to relief materials, often published in the national language (Flanagan et al., 
2011, p. 6). Nepal has 123 different languages, and only 44.64% of Nepal’s 27 million people 
speak the national language, Nepali, as their first language (Nepal National Planning..., 2014, p. 
55). Brahmin and Chhetri constitute what is commonly known as the higher castes in South 
Asia. The minority status map shows that the remote western regions are mostly dominated by 
majority ethnic groups, while the densely populated Terai, in addition to eastern and central 
Nepal, have large minority populations. This map demonstrates that districts in Nepal are highly 
diverse; in many districts, the majority group makes up less than 30% of the district population 
(see Appendix D).
Nepali is most common in the hill region of Nepal and significantly less common in Terai 
and high Himalayan regions (Nepal National Planning..., 2014, p. 55). Language competence is 
challenging to depict geospatially, especially since many people in Nepal speak more than one 
language; according to the 2011 Census, 41% of the population was at least bilingual (Nepal 
National Planning Commission Secretariat, 2014, p. 51). While many people in the Terai and 
mountain regions might have some knowledge of Nepali, the 2011 Census does not provide 
sufficiently detailed data to determine if the population can understand complex reconstruction 
documents and forms in Nepali.
Cutter et al (2003) argue that race and ethnicity can influence social vulnerability in a 
number of ways. Minority groups tend to lack access to resources and often face political 
marginalization (Cutter et al., 2003, p. 253). Exclusion from political processes is a prominent
consideration in caste-based Nepal. Askvik et al (2010) argue, “members of lower castes have 
been excluded from political representation and economic opportunities...Today caste 
discrimination is officially illegal but it has not disappeared” (p. 420). This project uses a 
simplified depiction of caste and ethnic groups to depict minority status. The simplified map 
identifies whether or not the major ethnic group in each district are native speakers of Nepali. A 
future project would include deeper research into methods for quantifying minority status in 
highly diverse societies. Given Nepal’s linguistic and ethnic diversity, this simplified binary 
metric omits some factors influencing social vulnerability.
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This social vulnerability index indicates higher vulnerability in western Nepal. These 
results are particularly worrisome, as geologists anticipate that Nepal’s next megaquake will 
likely be in western Nepal (Hand & Pulla, 2015, p. 485). The index also demonstrates surprising 
pockets of vulnerability in the hill region in Ropla, Gulmi and Okhaldhunga. An expansion of 
this project would use ward- or VDC-level data instead of district-level data. The notably low 
vulnerability the Kathmandu Valley region indicates that this index suffered from aggregating 
data to the district level. Kathmandu, Bhaktapur, and Lalitpur likely have communities with 
varying degrees of vulnerability, but the inequality in those districts skewed the index results. 
Again, a future study using disaggregated data would more accurately demonstrate social 
vulnerability across the country.
CHAPTER 2: DISASTER MANAGEMENT IN NEPAL
This chapter delves into the evolution, content, and enforcement of Nepal’s disaster risk 
reduction and management policies, primarily the 1982 National Calamity Relief Act (NCRA) 
and the 1999 Local Self-Governance Act (LSGA), and the extent to which these polices align 
with international best practice in disaster management. The 2009 Disaster Report calls the 
GoN’s disaster planning strategies “reactive...with rescue and relief as its key objective” and 
response to disasters “top heavy” (p. 152). Nepal’s existing disaster management policies 
exemplify two key components of disaster management best practice: mitigation and 
decentralization. The Natural Calamity Relief Act (NCRA) theoretically justifies increased 
emphasis on mitigation and risk reduction, while the Local Self-Governance Act (LSGA) 
justifies decentralized leadership in recovery and reconstruction. Though both concepts have 
legal backing, it is evident that neither the NCRA nor the LSGA has been operationalized 
effectively. The frameworks and fundamental ideas of the NCRA and LSGA are strong, but it is 
clear that both policies require revision to be effective during Nepal’s next disaster.
In the past, major disasters have sparked policy innovations in Nepal. The Udaypur 
earthquake of 1988, for instance, motivated the GoN to establish stronger building codes 
(Kreimer & Preece, 1991, p. 132). The 1974 Deurali landslide in Pokhara laid the groundwork 
for the creation of the National Calamity Relief Act (Nepal Disaster Report, 2011, p. 8). It is 
still too early to determine the long-term policy implications of the Gorkha earthquake. 
Nevertheless, it is certain that the Gorkha Earthquake, the largest modern disaster in Nepal, will 
have some effect on disaster management policy in Nepal. By analyzing the state of Nepal’s
existing disaster management policies, this project hopes to identify areas of improvement for 
policy revisions following the Gorkha Earthquake.
Defining best practice is a challenge in any discipline. What criteria determine best 
practice? How can best practices be measured? Who sets such criteria? Should development 
practitioners or academics define what constitutes best practice? Where does authority in best 
practice come from? This project argues that best practice comes both from academic and 
practical sources. Empirical academic literature provides critical insight into what does and does 
not constitute a best practice. “Gray literature,” such as LIN guides and publications, are also 
instrumental in shaping what constitutes best practice. International public agencies have 
significant clout in determining disaster management policy in developing countries like Nepal. 
In theory, empirical research informs UN guides and publications on best practices; as such, the 
practices outlined in the two bodies of work should coincide. This chapter considers sources 
related to mitigation and decentralization in disaster management. Academic sources were 
selected based on certain criteria. Only sources published 1) within the last 10 years, 2) in peer- 
reviewed journal articles, and 3) related to developing countries were considered relevant for this 
literature review. Practitioner publications come from the World Bank and United Nations 
International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR).
Best practice also stems from case studies. One particularly useful case study is Michael 
Useem, Howard Kunreuther, and Erwan Michel-Kerjann’s 2015 book Leadership Dispatches: 
Chile’s Extraordinary Comeback from Disaster. Useem et al.’s book catalogues the Chilean 
government’s innovative management strategies which were responsible for Chile’s swift and 
effective recovery from the 2010 Maule Earthquake. Though this text does not address disaster 
management in developing countries, its importance in the field of disaster management merits
inclusion in this project. Other academic case studies come exclusively from developing 
countries, mostly from the Asia-Pacific region. Case studies were collected using the following 
databases: Web of Science, Applied Social Sciences Index and Abstracts, and Social Science 
Research Network.
Each disaster is unique, and lessons learned from the management of one incidence may 
not always be applicable to other cases. For a number of reasons, it is ill advised to apply the 
principles and policies that facilitated Chile’s speedy recovery to Nepal. The Chilean 
government benefitted from strong local institutions, a predominant culture of individual 
responsibility and preparedness, and robust national copper reserves. At the time of the 2015 
earthquake, the GoN was still reeling from a decade of internal conflict, which impeded local 
elections and slowed development. Nonetheless, cases of deft disaster management can provide 
a roadmap for policy making in Nepal. The policies in place and any gaps in implementation 
before the Gorkha Earthquake were shaped by Nepal’s tumultuous civil war and ongoing 
political instability.
The People’s War
Before exploring Nepal’s disaster management policies, it is important to understand the 
politics behind said policies. Nepal’s current political climate, much like its topography and 
demography, is complex. After a decade of conflict, the Maoist insurgency or the “People’s 
War” in Nepal came to a close in 2006, with more than 13,000 lives lost and at least 392 billion 
Nepali Rupees of public property damage (Shakya, 2009, p. 2). In August 2016, Pushpa Kamal 
Dahal’s election as Prime Minister marked the 25th leadership change in 26 years (“The Cost of,” 
2016). For decades, Nepal has struggled for democracy and independence from its neighboring
superpowers, China and India. More than 10 years after the conclusion of the Maoist 
insurgency, Nepal’s political climate is still in transition.
At the time of the Gorkha Earthquake, Nepal was still a relatively young democracy, 
recovering from a decade of civil war and centuries of political oppression. Anand Swaroop 
Verma and Guatam Navlakha (2007) claim that “the struggle of the Nepalese people against the 
monarchy is as old as the kingdom itself’ (p. 1839). Throughout the 20th century, popular 
uprisings in Nepal struggled to eliminate an oppressive feudal system. In 1950, the Indian 
government undermined the Nepalese effort to overthrow the Rana autocracy by helping the king 
regain power (Verma, 2007, p. 1839). In 1961, King Mahendra sparked a royal coup to end 
Nepal’s first democratic government, replacing the Nepali Congress with the “partyless” 
Panchayat system. From 1961 to 1990, “the king wielded absolute power, governing through a 
largely rubber-stamp government and national assembly whose members were not permitted to 
identify themselves with any party or ideology” (Khadka, 1991, 694).
On February 13, 1996, after decades of frustration with Nepal’s feudal and autocratic 
regimes, the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CNP-Maoist) started the People’s War by 
attacking a police post in western Nepal.3 The guiding goals of the People’s War were to abolish 
the monarchy, establish a democracy, and elect an assembly to draft a new constitution (Do, 
2010, p. 736). A peace treaty concluded the War in 2006, and a former CNP-Maoist leader won 
the 2008 assembly elections to become Prime Minister in 2008. Since the 2006 peace treaty, 
Nepal has experienced numerous national leadership turnovers and significant political
3 For more information on the People’s War, see Prashant Jha’s Battles of the New Republic or Aditya Adhikari’s 
The Bullet and the Ballot Box.
polarization. Though the People’s War altered Nepal’s national political climate, it did not spark 
institutional change and capacity building at the local level.
The transition to democracy has been far from smooth. Nepal has “diverse regional 
interests, ethnic groups and hitherto neglected castes swathe process of democratization as an 
opportunity to put forward their demands. In the transition to democracy, numerous games of 
tug-of-war and horse-trading between political parties occurred” (Askvik et al., 2010, p. 420). It 
is hard to overstate the importance of effective leadership in disaster recovery. Useem et al. 
(2015) attribute a large degree of Chile’s successful recovery to the leadership and management 
of President Sebastian Pinera:
Much of Chile’s readiness for the massive 2010 earthquake and its recovery from the 
event stemmed from strategic decisions taken by its country leaders before and after the 
disaster. Their decisions entailed choices that were neither mandated nor preordained. 
Others in the same offices might have behaved differently and reached very different 
choices (p. 756).
This argument highlights two pivotal considerations in comparing the GoN’s management 
policies and priorities to those of other administrations. First of all, the Pinera administration’s 
decisions were largely shaped by its predecessors’ decisions. Fortunately, these decisions 
generally reduced vulnerability and risk in Chile. Alternatively, in Nepal, the decisions of 
previous administrations did not ready the country for their transformative disasters. The GoN’s 
decisions and leadership choices in response to the Gorkha Earthquake are drastically limited by 
the ineffective policies and oversights of its predecessors.
MITIGATION
Mitigation is a widely accepted component of best practice but is rarely operationalized 
effectively. Politicians face numerous obstacles in implementing mitigation projects. The 
benefits of mitigation spending are less obvious to constituents and often less immediate than 
investment in infrastructure, education, health services, etc. The time period immediately 
following a major disaster can be ideal to implement mitigation projects, as the public is more 
likely to support investment when a disaster is in recent memory. Mitigation is often broken into 
two categories, structural and non-structural mitigation. Structural mitigation refers to physical 
measures, such as retrofitting houses to increase seismic resistance; non-structural mitigation 
refers to measures excluding physical construction and engineering, such as policy interventions 
like awareness campaigns, trainings, and education. This project focuses primarily on non- 
structural mitigation activities and opportunities in Nepal.
The UNISDR (2010) argues that both structural and non-structural mitigation are more 
cost-effectiveness than post-disaster spending, yet governments often face political opposition 
when trying to implement mitigation measures (p. 32). Behavioral economists have explained 
the difficulty of implementing proactive, long-term disaster management policies to mitigate 
risks. People living in high risk areas often fail to implement risk reduction measures because 
they know the government will provide relief in the event of a disaster (Kunreuther, 2006, p. 
208). This phenomenon, known as “natural disaster syndrome,” is both inequitable and 
inefficient (Kunreuther, 2008, p. 912). Vulnerable people lack the incentives and resources to 
finance mitigation measures and become dependent on public generosity to recover from a 
disaster. Policies to reduce disaster risk, therefore, need to make mitigation measures affordable 
and appealing to vulnerable populations.
Robust evidence suggests that non-structural mitigation can be an affordable way to 
reduce risk (O’Brien, 2006; Dahal & Dahal, 2017, Shreve & Kelman 2014, Ganderton, 2005). 
For many developing countries, including Nepal, non-structural mitigation can mean the 
development and enforcement of stronger building codes. There are numerous cases of weak 
building codes leading to high casualty rates during disasters in developing countries. Pantelic 
(1991) argues it was the “inadequate implementation of building codes, rather than their 
absence” that caused the deadly structural collapses during the 1988 earthquake in Armenia (p. 
90). After the devastating 1985 Mexico City earthquake, the Government of Mexico prioritized 
the immediate implementation of strict building codes. Within 14 months of the earthquake, the 
Popular Housing Reconstruction (RHP) agency rebuilt 45,100 dwellings, averaging more than 
3,000 dwellings per month (Kreimer, 1991, p. 53). The Government of Mexico requested 
assistance from the World Bank to research new building codes and zoning measures to reduce 
earthquake vulnerability. Within five weeks of the earthquake, Mexico City implemented its 
new Emergency Building Codes in place (Pantelic, 1991, p. 90). The cases of Armenia and 
Mexico demonstrate that non-structural mitigation through designing and enforcing stringent 
building codes can lead to structural mitigation in the construction of safer buildings. Non- 
structural mitigation is generally a cost-effective way to reduce damage from natural disasters. 
Mitigation in Nepal
The Natural Calamity Relief Act (NCRA) represented an important step in organizing 
disaster management policy in Nepal. Comprehensive disaster management first entered Nepal’s 
political agenda in the 1970s after the devastating 1934 earthquake and a major landslide in 
Pokhara in 1974 (Nepal Disaster Report, 2011, p. 5). These events drew attention to the lack of 
coordination across disaster response agencies, and the international community pressured the
GoN to focus more on comprehensive disaster management {Nepal Disaster Report, 2011, p. 8). 
The stated goal of the NCRA was to make disaster management more organized and 
comprehensive. Prior to the 1982 earthquake, post-disaster activities operated on an ad-hoc 
basis, primarily through social work institutions {NepalDisaster Report, 2011, p. 8). The NCRA 
established a structure to coordinate response work and designated roles for local institutions in 
disaster response. In theory, institutions can operationalize the NCRA both before and during a 
natural disaster {NepalDisaster Report, 2009, p. 154). In many ways, the NCRA is inadequate; 
the Act prioritizes rescue and relief over mitigation and makes no provisions for research and 
development to find long-term solutions {Nepal Disaster Report, 2009, p. 161). These 
oversights dampen the importance and value of the NCRA.
The NCRA has received significant criticism. The 2011 Disaster Report claims, “there 
has been a general consensus that the country requires a new act to incorporate the whole 
spectrum of disaster risk management starting from risk reduction, mitigation to preparedness, 
response and reconstruction and rehabilitation” (p. 8). Though designed to improve mitigation, 
the NCRA emphasizes relief and preparedness but is ineffective and outdated (Moench & Dixit, 
2004, p. 43). One reason for the failure to implement the NCRA is the absence of local 
institutions. As of 2009, many of the NCRA subcommittees were not operating, and no local 
relief committees had been established {Nepal Disaster Report, 2009, p. 161). The lack of local 
institutions in Nepal is further discussed and analyzed in the next section on decentralization and 
the LSGA. The 2011 Report also claims that the NCRA was not designed to manage medium- 
or large-scale disasters like the 1988 Udaypur earthquake or the 1993 South-central flood (p. 19). 
The likelihood of another earthquake much larger than the 2015 Gorkha earthquakes 
demonstrates the need to implement policies capable of a managing a large-scale disaster.
In addition to the NCRA, the GoN has enacted policies to address disaster risk reduction. 
One noticeable shortcoming in policy during the Gorkha earthquake was the weakness and lack 
of enforcement for Nepal’s various building codes. The Udaypur earthquake in 1988 was a 
watershed moment for building codes in Nepal, as Alcira Kreimer and Martha Preece (1991) of 
the World Bank note:
Before 1988, there was no building code for low-cost and non-engineered building 
construction, and no appropriate zoning and land-use policies and regulations. Not even 
basic construction techniques, much less earthquake-resistant features, were always part 
of building practices. Most construction was done in the informal sector, so no training 
programs on seismic-resistant construction were available. Rural families commonly 
build on their own dwellings with the help of unskilled artisans (p. 132).
Though existing national building code policies do provide guidelines for earthquake-resistant
construction, adherence to building codes is far from standard. The 2009 Disaster Report calls
overall compliance to building codes “poor” and notes that “building codes are rarely adhered to
except perhaps in a few public buildings” (p. 119). The high rates of casualties and structural
damage caused by the Gorkha earthquake further validate a major reexamination of Nepal’s
building codes and their enforcement.
Based on established best practice guidelines discussed in this chapter, the NCRA aligns 
with best practice in theory but not in practice. By promoting policy interventions to mitigate 
risk, the NCRA presents an opportunity for increased disaster preparedness at all levels of 
government. The absence and relative weakness of local institutions makes it difficult to 
operationalize local community organizations designated in the NCRA. Building codes, like the 
NCRA, align with best practice in theory but not in practice. The GoN’s approved building 
codes include parameters for increasing seismic resistance, but the implementation of codes is 
inconsistent. The Gorkha earthquake has presented the GoN with a unique opportunity to
harness national and international resources to make major policy changes for disaster 
management in Nepal. The resulting public focus on disaster risk reduction can help the GoN 
implement better building codes and finance mitigation projects.
DECENTRALIZATION
Decentralization in disaster management is a cornerstone of UN best practice guidelines. 
Decentralization is a tricky term in disaster management literature; it covers a spectrum from the 
engagement of community stakeholders to complete community ownership of management 
decisions. Regardless of the degree of local ownership, both major aid organizations and 
researchers agree that a top-down approach to disaster management is ineffective and 
inequitable. The argument for local involvement in reconstruction is multi-faceted. Involving 
local communities develops local capacity, promotes efficiency and builds long-term resilience. 
The UNISDR (2010) outlines four ways in which local institutions are ideally situated to respond 
to disasters; unlike national or regional institutions, local institutions have 1) familiarity with 
local social, economic, environmental, and political systems, 2) accountability to constituents, 3) 
involvement in and familiarity with local development planning, and 4) proximity to affected 
communities (p. 11). The UNISDR also distinguishes between “government” and “governance.” 
The term “governance” implies that informal institutions often play pivotal roles in decision­
making processes (UNISDR, 2010, p. 1). This distinction is particularly important in Nepal, 
where local government is often nonexistent but local governance can be influential. The 
UNISDR (2006) also notes the importance of combining local knowledge with technology to 
improve risk reduction strategies (p. 23).
Other major UN publications address the importance of decentralized management of 
disaster recovery and planning processes. One of the most influential UN policies related to best
practice in disaster management is the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA), which set UN 
disaster risk reduction priorities for 2005-2015 at the Second UN World Conference on Disaster 
Risk Reduction in Kobe, Japan in 2005. The HFA identifies strong local governance and 
emphasis on proactive management as key components of effective disaster management 
(UNISDR, 2007, p. 5). The HFA’s successor, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk 
Reduction, echoes many of the principles of best practice outlined in the HFA. The Sendai 
Framework validates the argument for decentralized planning and management, stating that plans 
should consider specific local risks (UNISDR, 2015b, p. 10). The Sendai Framework also calls 
for the expansion of disaster risk governance, another tenet largely supported in theoretical and 
empirical academic research (UNISDR, 2015b, p. 14).
Substantial academic research supports the idea of local governance in disaster
management (Escaleras & Register, 2012; Krishnadas, 2008; Useem et al., 2015). Local or
decentralized management of relief and recovery has been successful in numerous past disasters.
Following the Maule Earthquake in Chile, President Pinera employed a system of “tiered
leadership,” which expedited reconstruction and engaged local people. Pinera’s Minster of
Planning, Felipe Kast, gave significant autonomy to local officials:
Upon taking office, he [Kast] believed that the government should target those most in 
need-as judged by those in Santiago. But in time he came to rely increasingly on the 
judgment of local mayors whose priorities and perceptions he appreciated would vary 
significantly, town by town... Some in the national government were leery that public 
funds might be improperly diverted for political purposes, but Kast found that mayors 
proved not less committed to overcoming the suffering, and granting them autonomy to 
engineer it had the effect of building their trust and customizing their work (p. 491). 
Though a cornerstone of best practice literature, local governance is rarely employed in
management scenarios.
Decentralization in Nepal
The Local Self-Governance Act (LSGA) is Nepal’s attempt to comply with best practice
by empowering local institutions. The practical failures of the LSGA are understandable
considering Nepal’s recent political history. After the dissolution of the highly centralized
Panchayat system, a new system of local governance emerged in the 1990s, which allocated local
governing power to village development committee (VDC) and district development committee
(DDC). Coalition governments and a decentralization commission emerged in the mid-1990s
and pushed for the creation of the LSGA in 1999 (Asia Foundation, 2012, p. 5). Though local
elections were held in 1992 and 1998, the intensity of the Maoist conflict led the government to
refrain from holding local elections again in 2002.
As its name suggests, the LSGA’s goal is to empower local institutions for self-
government. In many ways, the LSGA represents a continuation of the principles espoused in
the NCRA, though it took 19 years to identify local responsibilities in the LSGA after the 1982
NCRA. The LSGA was created based on the assumption that
.. .local people and local bodies are the most appropriate points of entry to meet 
development needs at the district, municipal, and village levels...empowering these 
institutions is expected to enhance local leadership and its capability to make appropriate 
decisions about matters affecting the day-to-day needs of local people (Nepal Disaster 
Report, 2009, p. 156).
The theories behind the LSGA are very much in line with accepted best practice in creating 
“tremendous opportunities” for local development of disaster risk reduction plans and programs 
(Nepal Disaster Report, 201 1, p. 12). Unfortunately, nearly two decades without local elections 
precluded the development of such local plans.
The absence of local institutions is a fundamental obstacle to effective disaster 
management in Nepal. The Asia Foundation (2012) concisely summarized the obstacles of 
Nepal’s highly centralized government structure:
.. .Nepali citizens rely on a range of informal arrangements to fill the void created by a 
weak state. Clearly, states rarely function the way they are meant to and often the 
government, for various reasons, even breaches its own procedures. This, for instance, is 
most visible in the untimely transfers of government officials and ad hoc fund allocations, 
particularly, at the local level. In other instances, because of unfunded mandates and lack 
of human resources many functions of the government are never executed. Beyond 
inability to rule by law and capacity issues, individual interests and incentives also 
produce behaviors and practices that are not described in formal documents (p. x).
The aforementioned “untimely transfers” of ad hoc funding have been painfully evident in the
GoN’s response to Gorkha earthquakes. More than one year after the earthquake, the GoN was
yet to fund the reconstruction of a single home (“The Cost of.. 2 0 1 6 ) .  Theoretically, the
NCRA allows the central government to share relief funds with local institutions via regional and
district governments. The 2009 Disaster Report, however, notes that “local-level funding is not
operational yet” (p. 156). In fact, as of 2009, many of the NCRA’s subcommittees were
“dormant, and no local disaster relief committees [had] been formed” {NepalDisaster Report,
2009, p. 161). The absence of such local institutions has been apparent throughout the Gorkha
earthquake recovery process, especially in terms of recovery financing.
The UNISDR (2010), however, notes that unofficial, informal organizations often play
pivotal roles in disaster management (p. 1). The presence of informal local institutions, such as
women’s community groups or cooperatives, could present the GoN with an opportunity to share
resources with rural areas devastated by the Gorkha Earthquake. Identifying and collaborating
with effective informal institutions could help the GoN more effectively support locally driven
recovery. Regardless of opportunities related to informal local leadership, the GoN should
prioritize building strong local institutions to reduce natural hazard risk. Empowering local
ownership of disaster preparation, relief and recovery processes is essential in aligning with best
practice.
CONCLUSIONS & NEXT STEPS 
Recommendations
This project determined that Nepal’s disaster management policies theoretically align 
with certain international best practices; yet, for a number of reasons, the theoretical foundations 
for effective disaster management have not led to the implementation of best practices. As such, 
this project has determined that Nepal’s policies are aligned with best practice in theory but not 
yet in practice. Due to time and data constraints, this project is unable to explain why a policy 
implementation gap exists in Nepal. Despite the limitations of this project, a few useful policy 
recommendations can be drawn from the findings.
1) Align policy implementations with an understanding of vulnerability. Chapter 1 
demonstrated that social vulnerability is complex and spatially varied throughout 
Nepal. Unique factors shape vulnerability in each zone, district, VDC, and ward in 
Nepal. An understanding of which factors exacerbate vulnerability should guide 
policy decisions. Integrating vulnerability into policy decisions should lead to 
locally-determined, less generic policies. Districts with high rates of feminization 
may need different policy treatments than districts with low rates of homeownership. 
A detailed study of vulnerability in Nepal would help shape more effective policies 
nationwide based on local needs.
2) Invest in non-structural mitigation. Chapter 2 highlighted the value of policy 
implementations like building codes in reducing vulnerability and increasing 
resilience. Though GoN policies set a precedent for strong building codes, it is clear 
from the Disaster Reports that these codes have not been standardized and 
implemented nationwide. Strong building codes reduce risk and exposure and
educate communities on risk. There are, of course, many obstacles to standardizing 
and implementing strong building codes in Nepal. Available building materials and 
hazard-specific risks vary geographically, and skilled labor is not widely available. 
Designing and implementing building codes that effectively reduce vulnerability will 
require community input and feedback. Policies should be designed with local 
capacities for building code implementation and monitoring in mind. For building 
codes to be implemented effectively, each district needs people trained to assess the 
safety of structures.
3) Invest in building social and institutional capital at local levels. As demonstrated in 
Chapter 2, strong local institutions can be instrumental in building resilience and 
creating effective disaster response. The LSGA gives communities influential powers 
to develop and maintain local organizations to manage disaster recovery. The GoN 
should prioritize determining why local institutions have not been formed and 
promoting the creation of strong institutions at all levels of government.
These recommendations come from a simplified understanding of obstacles to effective 
policy design and implementation in Nepal. Designing and implementing new policies require 
further research into the causes of vulnerability and reasons for the implementation gap 
established in this project.
Next Steps
An important takeaway from this project is the challenge of researching and 
understanding vulnerability, risk, and policy implementation in Nepal with existing data. Like 
many studies of developing countries, this project suffers from missing and incomplete data.
This project has identified several potential areas of study that would benefit from further
investigation. Potential future research questions include: To what extent does an understanding 
of social vulnerability shape decision-making processes at local, regional, and national levels? 
Why do the formal and informal organizations mandated by the LSGA not exist? What is the 
role of informal organizations in shaping disaster management decisions in Nepal? To what 
extent are informal organizations aware of the parameters outlined by the LSGA and NCRA? 
What incentives are available to encourage investment in mitigation? These questions could be 
answered through an empirical case study of local governance decisions in Nepal.
A future study would benefit from access to better data. This project focused on social 
vulnerability instead of biophysical vulnerability due to data availability. An integrated model 
considering both social and biophysical vulnerability would paint a much clearer picture of 
vulnerability in Nepal. A future vulnerability index would hopefully be able to use data a lower 
level of aggregation, ideally at the VDC or ward level. This project also had to rely on secondary 
sources to understand disaster management policies and practices because detailed primary data 
were unavailable. An expansion of this study would compare Nepal’s actual policies to case 
studies of high-risk districts to determine the extent of implementation failure. Case studies can 
be selected based on the vulnerability index, ideally using a mixture of highly vulnerable, 
moderately vulnerable, and minimally vulnerable VDCs to determine the relationship between 
policy implementation and vulnerability.
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